Mathias Broeckers was working on a book on conspiracies and conspiracy theories when 9/11 hit. Suddenly his study of dusty historical specimens was deluged by an outpouring of ideal research material, live on the screen. Aspiring to found the new science of conspirology, Broeckers doesn't fear the 'conspiracy theory' label. Instead he plunges into a fascinating exploration of the subject of conspiracy itself, before tackling the problems of evidence for two competing narratives: the 'Bin Laden conspiracy' theory, and dissident suspicions of a staged 'inside job' by conspirators within the government. From the Top Ten best-seller list in Germany, his original viewpoint will be warmly welcomed in his first English language edition.

In this book, an expert in the field explains why the United States is the world's largest debtor nation and how America's relationship to creditor states is of growing economic, diplomatic, and even national security concern. Foreign countries are not merely investing in U.S. corporations but are purchasing them outright: Abu Dhabi bought Citigroup securities, Kuwait purchased a large block Merrill Lynch stock, and China bought Morgan Stanley's convertible securities-and this happened before the September 2008 meltdown of Wall Street. The means by which wealthy foreign states make these purchases are sovereign wealth funds, their surplus capital that they are seeking to invest in order to generate the greatest return. Currently, the largest sovereign wealth funds are held by the United Arab Emirates (of which Abu Dhabi is part), Norway, Singapore, Kuwait, and the People's Republic of China; Qatar and Libya are also in the top ten. The United States has no such fund (although the state of Alaska does). This book takes a close look at China's and Norway's sovereign wealth funds to explain how they work. The author also uses domestic examples (Harvard's endowment, the California's state employees' retirement fund) to propose how the United States could create a sovereign wealth fund, speculating that such a fund could solve the looming Social Security funds shortfall. Most important, the book elucidates the national security aspects of not having an American sovereign wealth fund when so many other nations-both friend and foe-have them.

The rise in China's trade surplus, the increase in oil prices, and a slowdown in demand for U.S. assets from private investors abroad has increased the United States' reliance on foreign governments for financing. U.S. banks and broker-dealers now draw on the Persian Gulf, Singapore, China, and to a lesser degree Korea to shore up their depleted capital base. The scale of these flows is stunning. In 2007 purchases of financial assets by China's government almost exceeded U.S. consumers' purchases of Chinese-made goods, and the increase in the Gulf's dollar holdings almost certainly topped direct U.S. spending on Gulf oil. This report examines whether America's ability to secure large quantities of external financing from foreign governments is a reflection of its political power, a constraint on its ability to exercise power, or a combination of the two. It posits that the constraints associated with U.S. dependence on other governments for financing are rising and that the U.S. current account deficit is now a strategic vulnerability, not a sign of financial strength. The report concludes with recommendations to address the current account deficit and to strengthen the United States' position abroad.